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Trying to determine how best to allocate resources in health care is especially
difficult when resources are severely constrained, as is the case in all developing
countries. This is particularly true in South Africa currently where the HIV
epidemic adds significantly to a health service already overstretched by the
demands made upon it.
This paper proposes a framework for determining how best to allocate scarce
health care resources in such circumstances. This is based on communitarian
claims. The basis of possible claims considered include: the need for health care,
specified both as illness and capacity to benefit; whether or not claimants have
personal responsibility in the conditions that have generated their health care
need; relative deprivation or disadvantage; and the impact of services on the
health of society and on the social fabric. Ways of determining these different
claims in practice and the weights to be attached to them are also discussed.
The implications for the treatment of HIV/AIDS in South Africa are spelt out.
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KEY MESSAGES
  Trying to determine how best to allocate resources in health care is especially difficult when resources are severely
constrained as is the case in all developing countries.
  A conceptual framework is proposed that assists in thinking through the claims on health care, with an application to
treatment for HIV/AIDS in South Africa.
Introduction
While equal access to health care for equal need might be the
stated goal of many developing country public health care
systems, this equity goal is incompatible with the short- to
medium-term realities faced by countries attempting to
scale-up access to priority interventions. During the process of
scaling-up, many in need will not have access to care (Bennett
and Chanfreau 2005). Even in the long-run, resource scarcities
and issues of affordability could mean that equal access to care
cannot be achieved, especially if one adds the rider of ‘care of
an adequate quality’.
This paper proposes a conceptual framework that could be
used to enhance equitable resource allocation in the context of
resource scarcities and ongoing unmet need. The framework is
based around the notion of a claim (Broome 1991) and
communitarian claims (Mooney 1998), where an individual is
viewed as having a claim on health care in that she/he is a
member of a community or society and by extension, society
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464has some obligation to provide the care. However, claims are
not absolute with respect to their being met. When not all can
be met, society needs to allocate resources to those individuals
with relatively stronger claims. There is then a need to unpack
both the constituents of claims and their relative importance
when adjudging equitable resource allocation.
The conceptualizing of equity in health care is difficult. We
believe that to set equity in the framework of communitarian
claims has certain advantages, as one of us (GM) has set out
previously:
‘Given judgments about what constitute barriers and their
adjudged heights, the community has the basis for assess-
ing access or relative inaccessibility for different groups.
What the community does about reducing the variations in
relative inaccessibility for different groups is then based on
the community’s willingness to reduce different barriers –
their assessment of the strengths of claims for better access
of the different groups.’ (Mooney 2009, p. 225)
While this framework has broader relevance, it is applied in this
paper to the case of treatment for HIV/AIDS in South Africa.
The choice of this as a case study is useful for a number of
reasons. Firstly, the South African HIV epidemic poses a
significant burden on the public health care system. The
epidemic has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s; to date
there are approximately 6 million people infected, of whom half
a million are in need of treatment annually. Secondly, while
effective treatment exists, a relatively low proportion of those in
need have been able to access this care. Without care, death
normally occurs within 10 years of infection, but with care, life
expectancy is increased significantly. Thirdly, there are major
concerns regarding the affordability of maintaining even the
current levels of access to care (Cleary and McIntyre 2009).
There are also concerns about the sustainability of donor
funding on which the current programme is somewhat
dependent. In sum, while health care resources are always
scarce, the case of treatment for HIV/AIDS is starkly illustrative
of many of the equity issues posed by unmet health care needs
in developing countries more generally.
Conceptual framework
The first step in composing the conceptual framework is to
agree on the constituents of claims. A review of the equity
literature suggests a wide range of possibilities. These include
the need for health care (defined primarily in terms of
ill-health); the ‘social context’ of those in need (gender, age,
income, having or not having dependents, remote/rural/urban,
from minority or dominant culture, etc.); whether or not
claimants have personal responsibility in the conditions that
have generated their need for health care or their lack of need
for care (for example hang-gliders versus joggers, respectively);
the impact of the provision of care on the broader health of
society (including issues of opportunity cost and allocative
efficiency); the impact of illness and care on individuals,
households, communities and the overall macroeconomy; and
what might best be described as building bricks for a more
decent society (including positive discrimination for oppressed
or disadvantaged minorities, social option values that mean
that providing equal access for everyone is seen as a social
benefit, etc.)
These claims can be categorized in different ways. For
example, claims based on individuals’ betterment and those
based on society’s betterment. Some, at the risk of double
counting, may fall in both camps. For example, while the
option value of equal access for equal need could be viewed as a
social benefit, it also has benefit for the individual in need.
Claims may also be arranged along a continuum from ‘no free
choice’ to ‘free choice’.
The way in which claims are structured can take the analyst
in different directions. However, we have chosen here to build
on earlier work, but not specifically on claims, by Olsen et al.
(2003) and Evans and Stoddart (1990) to present a framework
based on ‘no free choice’ and ‘free choice’. (We are all too
aware of the likely criticisms of this stance as many will argue
that there are no or very few instances where there is genuine
free choice for the individual.)
Adopting that framework however and accepting it as
somewhat simplistic, many of the claims on the good noted
above can be summarized as in Figure 1, which has been
adapted from Olsen et al. (2003) and Evans and Stoddart
(1990). Each claim will be discussed in detail.
Claims based on the need for health
care
Claims 1 and 2 are based on need. A certain amount of moral
force is often associated with the word need—to have a need
for health care is different from wanting health care. The
former will also usually involve some third party (often a health
care professional) making an assessment while want is in the
patient’s mind.
While it might be argued that need is at least one constituent
of any claim on health care, there is debate about how need
should be defined (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). Two common
definitions as shown in Figure 1 are need as ill-health and need
as capacity to benefit from health care. Equating need to
ill-health suggests that people who are ill have a claim on
health care and people who are more ill have a greater claim on
health care. Defining need as illness can lead to resource
allocations that focus on the size of the problem as opposed to
the amount of benefit that can be obtained from these
allocations (Mooney 2003). On the other hand, need defined
as capacity to benefit recognizes that health care can only be
needed if it contributes to health (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993).
However, if a disease exists that can be treated, this does not
mean that it should be treated, or that it should be treated with
the most effective treatment available. Given scarcity of
resources, the opportunity cost of treating one need over
another must be considered (Mooney 2003).
The tension between need as illness and need as capacity to
benefit is relevant in the debate about the appropriate CD4
count threshold at which to initiate antiretroviral therapy
(ART) in developing countries. In South Africa, a patient is
medically eligible for ART if she or he has an AIDS diagnosis at
any CD4 level or a CD4 count of less than 200cells/ml at any of
the World Health Organization (WHO) stages of HIV
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Figure 1 A framework for considering to whom the good should be distributed. Solid arrows show the causes of illness and consequences of health
care. Dotted arrows show claims on the good
466 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNINGprogression. Two cost-effectiveness studies in African settings
have suggested that the incremental cost per QALY or life year
gained is lowest for starting ART at CD4<200cells/mli n
comparison to initiating care at higher thresholds (Badri et al.
2006; Loubiere et al. 2008; Walensky et al. 2009); while earlier
initiation is found to be more effective, it is also more costly.
This means that if the HIV-treatment budget is constrained, the
health of HIV-positive people would be maximized by starting
treatment at CD4 <200cells/ml.
On the other hand, within the group of patients starting ART
with CD4 <200cells/ml, it could be less cost-effective to delay
treatment to CD4 <50cells/ml in comparison to starting when
the CD4 count is between 50 and 200cells/ml (Cleary 2007). If
one were to define need as illness, these sicker patients would
be prioritized, but if need were defined as capacity to benefit,
an opportunity for a better prognosis for those who have
enrolled in the programme in a timely manner would be
preserved. The conflict between these two principles is likely to
be of ongoing concern for health professionals in resource-
constrained settings (Coetzee et al. 2004), particularly if waiting
lists to start treatment are long and if less than full coverage of
those in need can be achieved. Prioritizing the sicker patients
first despite their limited capacity to benefit could also be
viewed as reflective of the values underlying the rule of rescue
where, while there is some potential benefit for the rescued,
there is also likely to be a social benefit in that society feels
better. This is again an example of how claims can reflect the
betterment of the individual and society.
Claims related to responsibility and
the social context
The concept of personal responsibility suggests that society’s
recognition of a person’s claim on health care could differ if the
causes of his/her illness were exogenous as opposed to being
partially determined by personal risky behaviour (Edgar et al.
1998; Olsen et al. 2003). This is illustrated by a free choice
continuum at the top of Figure 1. The oval in the top left-hand
corner relates to having no free choice in one’s health status,
while presumably at the other limit one would bear full
responsibility. According to Roemer, to operationalize this one
would have to ensure that each individual’s capacity to choose
freely and/or exercise responsibility were similar (Roemer 1996;
Roemer 1993). The argument rests on the assumption that
there is a core of human nature that is common to everyone.
Except for social context and genetic factors, people have the
capacity to exercise equal levels of responsibility, but will
actually exercise different degrees of responsibility because of
circumstances or because of effort. Fairness allows our life
paths to diverge through our own effort, but not because of
circumstances that are out of our control. What this then
means is that the influence of personal responsibility needs to
be mediated via the person’s social context, as illustrated in
Figure 1.
A key consideration here is the argument put by Sen (1992)
that some people have an inability to manage to desire
adequately. If one accepts this proposition (and the authors
do) then this means that there is then a need to identify the
social context of those people who suffer from this inability and
make adjustments in their positioning on the no free choice/
free choice continuum.
Roemer’s approach, adjusted to take account of Sen’s inability
to manage desire, offers a possibility for assessing the strength
of claims on a good according to personal responsibility. To do
so precisely would require adequately distinguishing between
the myriad social contexts of individuals. There is then a risk of
penalizing people who have become unwell through no fault of
their own (Williams and Cookson 2000). Yet not to attempt this
may have yet greater costs as the alternative would seem to be
to ignore this factor altogether.
To debate and to try to agree some broad social categoriza-
tions where judgments are made about not so much personal
responsibilities but more social groupings’ responsibilities is
more attainable. Smokers, for example, may be too broad a
category but Aboriginal smokers in remote areas may be a more
acceptable category even if still not precise. Williams and
Cookson’s concerns here may be real but the best response is
not necessarily to abandon the task but rather to approximate
in the best way possible.
When applied to HIV-treatment, those who acquired HIV
through blood transfusion and other accidental or forced
exposure would have recourse to claim 3 on the good. This
claim would also include any unexplained variation in suscep-
tibility to HIV owing to personal genetic endowment. On the
other hand, because HIV is primarily sexually transmitted, and
hence potentially preventable, HIV-positive people have trad-
itionally been subject to high levels of stigma and discrimin-
ation; the dominant stereotype of HIV-positive people is
therefore one that casts them as immoral (Furber et al. 2004).
This inevitably leads to discussion of personal responsibility in
HIV acquisition. Even if one could argue that an individual has
full responsibility for his or her HIV status, one would have to
consider the socio-economic and psychological factors that led
to this action and whether this was truly a reflection of free
choice. Here we have an example of Sen’s inability to manage
to desire adequately. Even with repeated exposure, there are
many unknowns about why some people get HIV and others do
not.
The oval entitled social context draws attention to the
socio-economic circumstances of the majority of HIV-positive
people and to claim 4 on health care which is based on
deprivation. Globally, the HIV epidemic is mainly situated
within relatively poor countries. Sub-Saharan Africa has only
10% of the world’s population, but has over 60% of the world’s
HIV-infected people (25.8 million) (UNAIDS and WHO 2005).
Within South Africa there is evidence to suggest that poorer
communities have higher HIV-prevalence (Shisana et al. 2002)
and these same communities were more likely to experience
long-term economic and social discrimination under apartheid.
Campbell (2003) argues that two forms of social disadvantage
can be key determinants of poor health. These are poverty and
symbolic social exclusion caused by a lack of respect and rec-
ognition. Poverty can have a direct impact on health and
susceptibility to HIV-infection through malnutrition and para-
sitic infections (Stillwaggon 2002), and can limit a person’s
access to health-related knowledge and to health services
including treatment of STDs, again increasing vulnerability to
HIV-infection. Symbolic social exclusion can limit health
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self-adequacy and self-control (Evans and Stoddart 1990).
Both Stillwaggon and Evans and Stoddart however emphasize
the individual—the person’s access to health-related knowledge
and the person’s feelings of self-adequacy and self-control.
We would want to place these considerations more at the level
of the community. There are many communities in South
Africa which lack access to health-related knowledge and
which suffer from feelings of lack of adequacy and control. The
switch to the community level also makes the tasks of
identifying these characteristics and of obtaining relevant
data easier.
Claims related to the impact of
health care on health and wellbeing
Claim 6 suggests that society should balance personal respon-
sibility against the potential for health care to mitigate the
impact of ill-health and/or premature mortality on the social
fabric, defined following Haacker (2004) to include social and
economic institutions such as households, companies and the
government, and less tangible concepts such as social cohe-
siveness and solidarity. It could be argued that a solidaristic
society has a duty to forestall a discourse on responsibility for
HIV status. Adopting a distinction between the blameworthy
and the blameless erodes a compassionate response to people
who are suffering, and encourages stigmatization and discrim-
ination (Kopelman 2002). This may also be related to the rule
of rescue; thus ‘a decent society cannot stand by and do
nothing even if doing something will have no or little impact
on health.’
More generally under this claim may fall equality of access.
Society may want everyone who is sick to have access to
health care. It may be that in some instances the weight that is
attached to that claim may be zero but that need not always
be the case. Thus given that the ‘condition’ is HIV/AIDS, the
claim related to equality of access may be weighted as zero
because society argues that not everyone can have access. For
giving birth, society might argue that all should have access;
therefore in this case there is a positive weight attached to this
claim.
On the other hand, claim 7 assesses the impact of widespread
HIV-treatment on the health of society. Under this claim one
would need to consider the opportunity cost of allocating health
care resources to HIV-treatment as opposed to other needs, as
well as the potential positive or negative externalities associated
with treatment.
There are a number of positive and negative externalities
associated with ART in particular, and the overall impact on the
health of society involves the balancing of a number of
competing forces. On the one hand, the provision of ART
could lead to lower transmission of HIV per sexual encounter,
but because people live longer and potentially have a higher
number of sexual encounters during this time, net transmission
could be higher (Velasco-Hernandez et al. 2002). In addition,
poorly adherent patients could transmit drug resistant strains of
the virus (Blower et al. 2005).
Adjudicating over constituents and
strengths of claims
The key challenges in operationalizing the claims approach is to
develop a mechanism for deciding on, first, the constituents of
claims—what we have attempted above—and second, the
relative strengths of claims. Insights from procedural justice
are helpful in this regard. Rawls (1971) defines a number of
different types of procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice
can be understood by the example of the division of a cake. If it
is agreed that the fairest outcome is for everyone to get a piece
of the same size, then one possible procedure would be that
whoever cuts the cake gets the last piece. The key constituent of
this form of procedural justice is that there is an independent
criterion for defining a fair division (i.e. equal shares) and a
procedure that is guaranteed to lead to it. This differs from
imperfect procedural justice. Here there is an independent
criterion for the right outcome, but currently there is no
procedure that will lead to this outcome. For example, in the
case of criminal trials, it might be agreed that the fair outcome
is that those who are guilty are found guilty and vice versa for
those who are innocent. The problem is that the criminal justice
system is an imperfect procedure that cannot guarantee this
outcome. By contrast, the problem posed in this paper is one of
pure procedural justice where there is no independent criterion
for the right result. In other words, reasonable people will have
legitimate reasons to disagree about the constituents and the
strengths of claims on health care, but if a fair process is
followed in making decisions, the resulting outcomes could be
considered to be equitable.
Economists traditionally argue that procedures are only
valuable for their instrumental role in promoting better
outcomes. According to Wailoo and Anand (2005), this reflects
the notion of perfect procedural justice. For example, in the fair
division of a cake, the procedure of cutting the cake is valuable
if it ensures the outcome of a close to equal division. On the
other hand, in pure procedural justice, while procedures
continue to have instrumental value, they can also have
inherent or intrinsic value. The inherent value of procedures
is also suggested by those who advocate for a ‘communitarian
claims’ approach, where it is argued that the community finds
value in the process of being involved in decision-making
(Mooney 2005; Mooney and Jan 1997; Mooney 1998; Mooney
et al. 2002).
The situation, however, is more complicated if we bring two
added factors into the picture; compassion and varying tastes.
Rawls’ cake assumes we are individual free-floating atoms each
seeking to maximize our goods utility, here enjoyment of the
cake. Yet a compassionate mother who cuts the cake for her
kids may choose to have the last and smallest piece. The
question for any society here is whether they want a compas-
sionate society or one where individualism rules.
The example of Rawls’ cake also assumes that everyone likes
cake equally and that the society believes that all are equally
deserving of cake or that an egalitarian society is what is
wanted. These assumptions are open to question and we would
argue open to question by the cake-consuming community
concerned as a community.
Quite how to get the community involved in setting claims
and their relative strengths remains to be determined. There is
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best done through citizens’ juries (Lenaghan et al. 1996;
Lenaghan 1999), while the weighting of claims can be achieved
using, for example, discrete choice experiment (DCE) tech-
niques (Ryan and Farrar 2000).
Ensuring there is fair process
Daniels (2004) argues that the central requirements of fair
process are:
  Publicity: the process must be transparent and involve
publicly available rationales for the priorities that are set.
This has the added benefit of encouraging good governance.
  Relevance: stakeholders who are affected by the decisions
should agree that they rest on reasons, principles and
evidence that they view as relevant to making fair decisions
about priorities. This has the added benefit of assuring
stakeholders that their voice has been heard.
  Revisability and appeals: decisions can be revisited and
revised in light of new evidence and arguments. This appeals
process provides protection to those who have legitimate
reasons for being an exception to adopted policies.
  Enforcement or regulation: a mechanism is in place to
ensure that the previous three conditions are met.
These requirements are a potentially useful starting point.
Daniels’ publicity, however, we would rather see as simply
transparency. In most countries, priority-setting decisions are
taken behind closed doors. If transparency is to be attained, the
full rationales, resultant recommendations and any complaints
or disputes related to these decisions would need to be in the
public domain in a format that was comprehensible to a lay
audience. There are a number of intrinsic and instrumental
values to transparency. Firstly, it gives legitimacy to decisions
that are taken (Wailoo and Anand 2005) and gives the public
greater confidence in the process and the outcomes (Daniels
2004). Secondly, people value knowing why decisions that
affect their lives have been taken in the way that they have
been taken (Litva et al. 2002; Wailoo and Anand 2005). Thirdly,
a form of precedence emerges which assists in consistency over
time. This has intrinsic value from an equity perspective as it
ensures that like cases are treated in a like manner (Wailoo and
Anand 2005). Consistency also has instrumental value since the
setting of precedence assists in future decision-making, thereby
improving the quality of decision-making over time.
Following the relevance condition, society should be able to
influence the kinds of rationales that are permitted to serve as a
basis for decision-making. These ‘reasonable rationales’ could
be set within a communitarian claims process, where society
sets the ‘structures, principles or rules on which to base the
social welfare function...and hence the basis for priority setting
in health care’ (Mooney 1998, p. 1173). In other words, society
could be consulted about the personal characteristics of people
that could serve to justify additional claims or limitations of
claims on the good. The latter deals with issues of vertical
equity—the unequal but equitable treatment of unequals. It
might be decided that HIV-positive people have a dispropor-
tionate claim on health care resources given the social context
of sufferers and the impact on the social fabric and the health
of society that treatment affords. Communitarian claims is not
about replacing the bureaucrat; instead society would play a
role in establishing the value base of the health care system and
the bureaucrat would have a role in ensuring that the system is
managed according to these values (Black and Mooney 2002).
Research has shown that society finds intrinsic value in having
a voice in decisions; allowing the public to set reasonable
rationales provides one avenue for this voice (Litva et al. 2002;
Wiseman et al. 2003; Wailoo and Anand 2005).
The third requirement for fair process is revisability and
appeals. This suggests that any decisions will tend to be more
acceptable if there are mechanisms which allow decisions to be
challenged and reversed if required (Wailoo and Anand 2005).
This requirement also allows for the improvement and revisit-
ing of policy over time as resource constraints, technologies or
societal preferences change. Revisability is strongly related to
the transparency condition because the transparency of the
original decision both in terms of rationales and ultimate
recommendations facilitates the identification of mistakes. It
also provides an avenue for parties affected by decisions to
appeal. Further, any changes to decisions would need to be
implemented consistently.
The final requirement for fair process is regulation and
enforcement. A mechanism needs to be created to ensure that
the fair process complies with the adjusted requirements above.
Steps towards the implementation of fair process would
include clarifying institutional levels of decision-making, de-
veloping structures to address decisions at each level, training
to develop competence in fair process, learning from experience,
improving the process through training and research, and
developing mechanisms for enforcement (Daniels 2004).
Although the development of fair process should not stall the
scaling up of treatment, as fair process is developed it could
have additional benefits through serving as a model for other
decision-making in the health care system, improving account-
ability and empowering communities (London 2003). Rather
than framing the poor and marginalized as candidates for
redistributive policy by a benevolent state (McIntyre and Gilson
2002), this approach encourages active community participation
in resource allocation in health which could improve the ability
of civil society to hold governments and donors to account,
with both instrumental and intrinsic value.
Conclusion
What does all of this mean for the treatment of HIV/AIDS in
South Africa? In principle it means accepting the need to
establish a set of principles or a constitution as the value base
or philosophy which is to underpin decision-making. No
rational decision can be made about how much of the health
service budget to spend on such treatment, nor how that is to
be spent, without establishing such principles. It also implies or
advocates that the South African society as a society needs to
be involved in setting both these principles and the claims and
weights for claims that are implied in this set of principles. The
paper has made the case for such an approach.
At a more practical level the paper has identified different
ways of considering claims and has exemplified these using a
continuum from ‘free choice’ to ‘no free choice’. It has also
CLAIMS ON TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS 469given some examples of what claims might comprise and how
the use of these might in turn influence policy on HIV/AIDS.
The case of HIV/AIDS in South Africa is one where resource
scarcity is a particularly important issue and the issue of
affordability has to be addressed very openly (Cleary and
McIntyre 2009). There is every reason to believe, however, that
this approach can be applied in all situations where there are
scarce health care resources.
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